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Abstract 
Since stock prices reflect the firm’s future earnings 
potentials (Miller and Rock, 1985), dividends 
announcements therefore convey new information to the 
market about the future prospects of the corporation. As 
such, the objective of the current study is t
potential role that dividend payouts play in influencing 
the fund managers and investors in recommending or 
selecting a stock, and for various stocks’ performance 
assessment. In addition, the study attempts to examine 
the possible effect of taxation on dividends payout. The 
study uses qualitative methods in form of semi
structured interviews conducted with six Malaysian 
investment managers. The findings revealed that 
dividend payouts are not solely used as a basis for stock 
recommendation and assessment of companies’ 
performance by fund managers in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, taxation was found to be significant in 
determining dividend payouts by companies in Malaysia. 
These findings have great contributions to the dividend 
policy theory, as well as to the practitioners and policy 
makers that are discussed in details at the end of the 
paper.  
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2019.
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1. Introduction 
Aspects of dividend policy relationship to agency cost models and other corporate 
objectives have attracted enormous discourse in academic journals and other publications 
in recent times. This is primarily because the regulation of agency conflicts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) is usually impaired with various issues pertaining to a firm’s dividend 
policies. However, the study of dividend policy relationships to other corporate events 
became highly important after the pioneering article by Modigliani and miller (1958) 
where they argued that under certain conditions, the value of firms is dependent upon its 
dividend policies.   
Dividend decisions have also been regarded as one of the most important decisions that 
face modern corporations (Mollah, Keasey and Short, 2000). Agency theory precisely looks 
at the conflicts of interest in the principal-agent relationship. It relates the responsibilities 
of the managers who acts as an agent and therefore wishes to bond his activities to those of 
the principal who may wish in many circumstances to monitor and control the agent1.  
Different strands of research in this area have been focused on different issues pertaining 
to agency relationships and other corporate objectives. Broadly, the various literatures 
have been focused on how to address agency problems between corporate insiders and 
outside shareholders of the same corporation (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Myers, 
1998) in relation to the corporations’ dividend strategy. Agency theory suggests that 
corporate managers are agents of the shareholders of the corporation and their 
relationship is usually fraught with conflicting interest (Jensen, 1986), relating to the 
amount of dividends required by such shareholders. This is primarily because, such pay-
outs to shareholders drastically reduces the amount of cash flow that will be available to 
managers for investments in projects that may have a zero or positive net cash flow 
discounted at the required cost of capital.  
To reduce these agency conflicts, firms sometimes engage in different policies that include, 
firm’s optimum monitoring and bonding package (Rozeff, 1982) and financial policy trade-
off (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). Recently, discussions have been geared towards 
understanding dividend policies relationship to corporate objectives of share price 
                                                          
1
 Arrunada, (1999) suggested this though in the context of auditing research while evaluating the responsibilities of 
the auditor who acts as an agent in different auditing projects. 
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maximisation.   
Foremost researchers did recognize the importance dividend pay-out plays to a firm. They 
have suggested arguments like the fact that, it projects firm’s long term stability, growth 
prospects, signalling future liquidity, influences the overall capital structure both at present 
and in the future, determines future stock price growth, etc. However, recent research has 
seemingly been concentrated on narrower aspects of these issues. Suggestions pertaining 
to its effects on the share price, its functions relating to the availability of positive NPV 
projects (The residual theory), etc.  
The financial contributions for corporations are usually based on internal and external 
sources of finance. This is either through debt or equity capital that constitutes external 
sources of financing for corporations or by retaining the earnings of the corporation 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2004). Managerial successes are mostly evaluated and tied 
on the amount of profits that can be generated during their entire tenure, which forms the 
basis for the evaluation of firm’s shareholder wealth. In the circumstances, dividend 
payments may represent a significant aspect in evaluating managerial expertise by 
outsiders as it is usually tied on the level of profits that has been generated by the firm.  
This research reviews the various theories relating dividend policies to various corporate 
objectives. Broadly, it looks at dividend policies impact on agency conflicts and share price 
maximisation. It also evaluates other theories that include the residual dividend theory.  
The research investigates the significance of dividend policies in fund managers investment 
decisions, as well as the role it plays in forecasting possible changes in stock prices. 
Furthermore, the study attempts to identify the possible effect of taxation and other factors 
on the dividend pay-out decisions. Specifically, the research attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Does dividend payment have implication to the share prices of the company? 
2. What signalling effect does the payment of dividends play in various corporations? 
3. Do tax payments influence companies’ decisions of dividend pay-out?    
2. Literature Review   
2.1. The relevance/Irrelevance Hypothesis of Dividend Policies 
Several theories and opinions have been either supportive or critical on the rationale being 
the payment of dividends by various corporations. Economists have long found dividends 
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to be mysterious (Easterbrook, 1984). Dividends irrelevance theories argue that, dividends 
are irrelevant while dividends relevance theories do argue that they are relevant for 
investors.  
2.2. Dividend Irrelevance Theory of Miller and Modigliani 
This theory recognized the average investor as being indifferent with the payment of 
dividends and capital gains. The theory argues that under certain firm’s conditions, its 
value is usually independent of the firm’s debt to equity ratio. The theory usually termed 
the cost of capital theory further states that the overall cost of capital remains constant as 
the financial gearing of a firm increases. However, they recognized that other factors may 
affect a firm’s dividend policy that includes, the firm’s personal taxes, transaction costs, 
clientele effect, and so on. The specific problem here is that dividends are recognized as 
costly and yet ubiquitous (Easterbrook, 1984). 
There is therefore no rationale in the payment of dividends by corporations and the harder 
corporations try to pay dividends, the more puzzling it becomes. The irrelevance theory 
argues that, firms that reduced dividends payout prosper (better off) relative to others 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Following this pioneering research by Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
researchers have argued that the value of a firm is dependent on its dividend policies. 
However, recent researchers have argued that the value of a firm does not rely on its 
dividends policies but on the potential earnings power of the corporation.  
2.3. Dividends and the Firm’s Capital Structures 
Researchers have long argued on different aspects of the ability of dividend policies in 
determining firm’s capital structures. Following Faulkender and Petersen (2005), the two 
major financing policies of various corporations are the relationship relating its dividend 
policies to its capital structures. Suggestions purported by Jensen (1986) argues that 
dividends can be used as a way of retiring a firms’ debt burden rather than wasting 
available and free cash flow on unprofitable investments. Additionally, research has treated 
dividend policies and aspects of capital structure as two distinct policy variables, but there 
is several research that have suggested that both have common factors and that 
corporations treat both as part of financial planning determination (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2005).  
A very important part of recent theories is that dividend policies and capital structures are 
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jointly determined by control allocations between managers and investors and variations 
in both are therefore driven by the same underlying factors and assumptions (Faulkender 
and Petersen, 2005). A very important issue that shapes dividend policies is the conflict of 
interest between bondholders and shareholders. While shareholders will want to be paid 
more dividends, bondholders will always think that they are trying to expropriate wealth 
from them. However, it has been suggested that this conflict can be mitigated when firms 
hold more collateralizable assets because these assets may serve as collateral against 
borrowing (Titman and Wassels, 1988). 
2.4. Dividends and the Residual Dividend Theory of the Firm 
This model argues that firms usually base their dividend policies on their cash flows needs 
and capital structure decisions (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). For example, when they 
recognized positive NPV projects, they will prefer to retain some of the corporation’s 
earnings for the investment in such projects and the residual cash flow will be utilized to 
pay dividends. On the other hand, when they do not recognize positive NPV projects, they 
may decide to pay dividend when free cash flow is available.  
2.5. Dividend Policy Relationship to Agency Theory 
Researchers have recognised different factors, as having a significant impact on a firm’s 
dividend policy. Following the seminal study of Jensen and Meckling (1976), other studies 
have provided realistic arguments linking agency cost as playing a significant role in the 
determination of firm’s capital structure, other financial activities and its agency cost. 
Easterbrook (1984) suggested that the payment of dividends by firms reduces corporate 
agency cost. Following the agency model developed by Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), 
large shareholders can use information they discover about their firm’s qualities to reduce 
the potential agency problems.  
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) recognized that the payment of dividends is better for 
institutions as the distribution of free cash flow to stockholders and other shareholders is 
usually better than investments in negative and unprofitable net present value projects.  
Researchers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley and 
Hansen, 1989; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992) have long suggested that the payment of 
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dividends have a significant impact on the agency problem2 between manager and 
shareholder by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers. Several years ago, 
research by Shleifer and Vishney (1986), recognised that dividends can be used as a 
mechanism to compensate company’s institutional investors. Another kind of conflict exists 
between shareholders and corporate bondholders as it has been suggested that 
shareholders can voluntarily appropriate bondholder’s wealth through a voluntary 
payment of high dividends to themselves (Smith and Warner, 1979).  
2.6. Conflict of Interest Connecting Dividend Payments to Corporate Objectives 
Following Jensen (1986), corporate managers sometimes have divergent objectives to 
those of shareholders and other stakeholders. In this setting, they will presumably not be 
able to employ the utilization of incentive contracts to enhance their managerial 
opportunism but paying out cash in the form of dividends may be a reliable way of 
expressing such opportunism.  
The more a firm is financed by outside or debt capital, the more it is subject to more capital 
market and other institutional controls (DeAngelo et al., 2004) thereby leading to potential 
agency problems involving disputes between the shareholders, who are outside 
contributors to the firm’s capital and the firm’s management. In these circumstances, firms 
will prefer to finance future project through retained earnings rather than through external 
capital. Several suggestions have been of the opinion that dividends should be used to 
compensate institutional investors since institutional shareholders do have a probability to 
find value improvement investments (Allen et al., 2000).  
Managers frequently have the choice between satisfying the aspirations of institutional 
shareholders and share price maximisation. When firms do pay higher dividends, they 
attract higher institutional ownership, and such institutions do in turn require playing a 
larger role in overseeing management than retail investors. Managers will therefore have 
the choice to weigh the effect of the positive relationship to the share price response when 
dividends are announced against annoying institutional investors through a reduction in 
dividends as responses to poorer performance. Additionally, the probabilities of paying 
dividends increase with the amount of equity earned in the capital structure of the 
                                                          
2
 Models developed by Allen et al., (2000), posits several implications, for example the model assumes that firms 
with more severe agency problems are more likely to pay dividends in order to control them. 
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corporation (DeAngelo et al., 2004).  
2.7. Empirical evidence  
Researches relating to the reasons why firms pay dividends have been pervasive. Despite 
the unfavourable tax treatment of dividends, researchers have long recognised that firms 
and shareholders are frequently focused on the amount of dividends to be paid by various 
corporations. A wholly accepted view suggests that dividends are valuable signals of firms’ 
prospects and future profitability (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985). Dividends 
can be used to attract institutional shareholders of the firm as the presence of large 
institutional shareholders usually signal firm quality and are properly managed (Allen et 
al., 2000). Dividends may also be used to control insiders thereby limiting their frequent 
lack of control (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) in for example, managing free cash flow. 
Otherwise, dividends may be preferred because they may influence a lower transaction 
cost relative to the firm’s capital gains since investors sometimes view income from 
dividends different from those capital gains (Perez-Gonzalez, 2003).  
Dividends are very important for companies and company boards usually declare regular 
dividends and raise them from one period to the other. Many managers recognise that a 
higher dividend leads to higher share prices for their companies (Easterbrook, 1984). 
However, progressive firms may be more willing to withhold dividends and use cash 
generated for reinvestment because internal financing is cheaper than issuing dividends 
and floating new securities (Easterbrook, 1984).  
Similar dividend policy aspects including the perceived relationship between dividend 
payment policy and share values, the impact of taxation and attitudes to share buybacks 
were also explored by McCluskey, Broderick, Boyle, Burton and Power (2010) in the Irish 
context. The authors found that dividends are an important in investor decision-making 
processes and that dividends influence share valuations. Another key finding is that fund 
managers appear to be able to influence the dividend policy of Irish companies in which 
they have a shareholding. Finally, taxation issues appear relatively unimportant and the 
majority of fund managers prefer cash dividends to buybacks. 
In the Malaysian context, Lee, Isa and Lim (2012) investigated the relationship between 
dividend changes and future profitability of firms. The authors found that dividend changes 
are strongly related with contemporaneous earnings changes, weakly related with one year 
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ahead of earnings changes and largely unrelated with earnings changes beyond one year. 
Further, the authors found weak evidence that the size of dividend changes is related to 
future profitability.  
In the same context, Zainudin, Mahdzan and Yet (2018) analysed the relationship between 
stock price volatility and dividend policy of industrial products firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. The study covered a sample of 166 public-listed firms spanning from 2003 to 
2012, and used Baskin’s framework (Baskin (1989). The findings revealed that earning 
volatility significantly explains stock price volatility during the crisis period, while dividend 
payout ratio predominantly influences volatility during pre- and post-crisis sub-periods. 
These studies shed light on dividend policy and behaviour among firms listed in the 
Malaysian stock market. Nevertheless, further analysis is required to comprehensively 
examine the dividend policy practices by Malaysian fund managers.    
3. Methodology  
In line with the abovementioned objectives, a qualitative research approach is used. 
According to Merriam (2009), qualitative research allows the researcher to understand 
how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what 
meaning they attribute to their experiences (p.5). 
The choice of qualitative research methodology can be further explained by its ability to 
generate comprehensive details about dividend policies and payouts and how they are 
perceived and used by various fund managers and investors. In contrast to brief answers to 
structured questions which will not be able to provide the required in depth information to 
adequately assess the issue at hand (Weischedel, Matear and Deans, 2005).  
As such, an initial list of interviewees was established covering some of the investment 
companies in Malaysia that are perceived to be suitable for the study. A total of six 
interviewees were subsequently selected based on specific criteria, namely, experience in 
the fund management and investment field, exposure to the main issues of dividends 
payouts and policies, and educational level. Particularly, the selected interviewees are at 
least holders of a Master’s degree in related specialisations (mainly finance and 
economics). Moreover, the interviewees have a minimum of five years of experience in 
investment management. This allows the interviewees to understand and respond to 
detailed questions concerning the issues related to dividend payouts. In this regard, Polit, 
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Beck and Hungler (2001) recommend that not more than ten interviewees should be 
included in the study, to allow an in-depth exploration of topics in phenomenological 
studies. Furthermore, the sample of six respondents is considered suitable since a similar 
sample has been used in comparable studies (Tijani, Fifield and Power, 2009; Koenigstorfer 
and Klein, 2010).  
Table 1. Interviewees Profiles 
Interviewee Function Location  Years of 
experience 
Educational level 
A Fund Manager Kuala Lumpur Ten to fifteen 
years 
Master’s degree 
B Fund Manager Kuala Lumpur More than fifteen 
years 
Master’s degree 
C Fund Manager Kuala Lumpur Five to ten years Master’s degree 
D Fund Manager Kuala Lumpur Ten to fifteen 
years 
Master’s degree 
E Academician with 
investment 
experience 
Kuala Lumpur Five to ten years Ph. D degree 
F Academician with 
investment 
experience 
Kuala Lumpur Ten to fifteen 
years 
Master’s degree 
 
It is worth noting that all the interviews were reviewed several times before been 
transcribed. Subsequently, a phenomenological approach to analyse data was adopted, 
which involves interpreting and reflecting on the data transcript so as to achieve a holistic 
understanding of the meaning of the participants’ experiences (Alexis and Vydelingum, 
2007). 
4. Summary of findings  
This section presents a summary of the main interview findings on three successive but 
related themes, namely, the extent of importance of dividend policies for shares’ expected 
performance and selection by fund managers. Secondly, the signalling effects of dividend 
payouts and their implications, and finally, the role of taxation in determining dividend 
payout and policies.  
Firstly, it goes without saying that information is the most important and precious 
commodity in financial markets, and one of the most important information an investor can 
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obtain in financial markets are earnings and dividend announcements. A considerable 
number of studies have demonstrated that indeed dividend announcements have a 
significant effect on securities’ selection (Miller and rock, 1985; McCluskey et al., 2010). In 
line with this argument, most of the interviewees were of the opinion that dividend 
announcements can sometimes be significant in understanding the future trend of a 
company’s stock; however it cannot be used as a basis to make investment 
recommendations. Indeed the interviewees noted that in many cases, the announcement 
comes in contradiction with the results of the financial analysis performed by the 
investment company and the recommendation to be made. This can be simply explained by 
the fact that sometimes a dividend payout is a strategic financial decision made by the 
company to boost investors’ confidence in its stock, in an attempt to manipulate the 
market’s perception about the company’s stock, regardless of its actual performance, and 
away from the profits actually realised in a given year (Aroni, Namusonge and Sakwa, 
2014; Olang and Grace, 2017). Hence, announcing a dividend payout by companies has had 
varying implications in the case of Malaysia. For instance, interviewee E noted that 
dividend payouts are usually included as one of the parameters for recommending a stock 
when there is a sustainable and growing trend of dividend payments, and when the 
dividend announcement is in line with the rest of the considered parameters.   
On the other hand, dividend payout has been seen as a powerful signalling factor under the 
signalling hypothesis, and this has been demonstrated in several empirical studies 
(Brickley, 1983; Czapiewski and Kubiak, 2018). However, it was noticed through the 
interviews that most of the interviewees disagreed with this principle. To most of them 
there is more significant reliance on free cash flows to gain insight on the future trend of 
stock. And evidently dividend or earnings announcements are not always equivalent to 
positive performance by the company. In other words, they do not have a direct effect on 
the stock price. Hence, most of the interviewees disagree with the dividend signalling 
hypothesis in the Malaysia context.  
Finally, dividend payouts have always been associated with the taxation systems and tax 
payments. Specifically, the level of tax might determine the amount of dividend that the 
company would distribute to shareholders, and hence the net dividends to be actually 
received. At this level, most of the interviewees perceive that taxation is practically 
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significant in influencing the dividend payouts by companies. Hence, this has the potential 
of directly causing agency issues, as the payment of dividends is suggested to eventually 
reduce the agency issues and costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Ghosh and Sun, 2014). This finding 
contradicts the findings by McCluskey et al. (2010) who found that taxation issues are 
relatively unimportant for the majority of the Irish fund managers. This might be explained 
by the difference between the Malaysian and Irish financial markets and economic 
conditions, which will eventually have an impact on the investment style and determining 
criteria.   
5. Discussions and conclusion 
The main objective of the study was to explore the importance of dividend payouts in 
investors’ selection and recommendation of companies’ stocks as well as the eventual 
signal that dividend payouts might provide to investors on the future trend of stocks. 
Finally, the study attempted to examine the possible effect of taxation on dividend payouts. 
To achieve these objectives, in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with six 
investment managers in Malaysia. Overall, the findings revealed that dividend payouts are 
not solely used as a basis for stock recommendation and assessment of companies’ 
performance by fund managers in Malaysia. Furthermore, taxation was found to be a 
significant in determining dividend payouts by most companies in Malaysia.  
These findings have significant implications for the dividend theory, as well as for the 
practitioners and policy makers. Firstly, it shows that the dividend signalling hypothesis is 
not valid in all settings. It largely depends on the nature of the companies and their 
respective sectors, but it mostly depends on the trend of dividends payout and their 
historical magnitude and sustainability. This finding further supports the dividend 
irrelevance theory at least in the Malaysian context, as most of the interviewees usually 
disregard the dividend payouts in recommending and assessing stocks’ performance.  
On the other hand, the policy makers should take these findings into account to enhance 
financial investment, especially regarding taxes. It would be very significant to develop a 
comprehensive tax system that fairly and accurately accounts for dividends received from 
different countries for the benefit of the shareholders as well as the original country’s 
authorities. In addition to that, fund managers as well as independent investors in Malaysia 
should be aware that dividends’ announcements do not always signal the proper indication 
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they are expected to, sometimes they intend to send a reversed message. Hence, if they 
consider dividend payouts as one of the factors for selecting a stock, then they need to 
always have a comprehensive analysis that include a set of other factors as well. Moreover, 
they have to watch these dividends for a long period time, long enough to establish a trend 
of development in payouts that might give them a hint on the possible future developments 
of different companies’ shares.  
Though the current study has significant contributions, there also some limitations that 
have to be noted. Firstly, the study employed qualitative analysis only in the form of 
interviews and document analysis. Certainly, the study could have amounted to more 
significant findings if both qualitative and quantitative methods were used and 
triangulated. Hence, this is highly recommended for future studies. Secondly, the study 
focused only on the Malaysian context which renders the findings ungeneralizable to other 
settings. As such, future studies are highly recommended to extend these findings to more 
diverse settings for generalization purposes. Finally, the study focused only on taxation as a 
factor that influences dividend payout, while the other possible factors were not 
emphasized in this study. Thus, the future studies are highly recommended to focus on the 
other factors that can possibly affect the dividend payouts in various regions.   
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